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ABSTRACT 
The procurement decision is not the decision to invest in public infrastructure. The 
procurement decision is what is more cost effective: public provision or a public-private 
partnership (P3). Determining and discounting the public infrastructure are accomplished 
by detailing the total risks, illustrating the importance of the IRR in evaluating the cash 
flows, and providing a framework in which to evaluate the procurement decision based 
on generated savings. A recent P3 example is used to support the arguments made by 
taking a critical look at current valuation practices and using the proposed framework and 
discount rate. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to outline the procurement decision, provide a framework 
with which to evaluate this decision, and illustrate the importance of discounting the 
procurement decision with the appropriate cost of capital. The debate surrounding 
discount rates often centers on finding the correct rate with which to assess the most cost 
effective method of delivering public infrastructure. This paper will show that much of 
what has been already discussed regarding discount rates and public-private partnerships 
(P3) applies only to investment decisions. This model uses a different framework that is 
applied following such decisions; it uses the correct cost of capital as a discount rate for 
the "procurement" decision . The procurement decision , in the context of this paper, is 
whether to use public provisions or public private partnerships (P3) when delivering 
public infrastructure. 
After defining a P3, the paper proceeds as follows. It first considers the rationale for a P3 
as perceived by government. Second, this paper conducts a literature review to illustrate 
the importance of the discount rate in pricing these projects and their proposed P3 
arrangements. An argument that much of the reviewed literature focuses on the 
investment decision is made. Third, we identify the risks that value the project and 
illustrate how the risks inherent in these projects are largely the same regardless of 
funding. A detailed look at discount rate theory shows how the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) provides theoretical explanation or underpinnings of the weighted 
average cost of capital (W ACC). Also that the latter, because debt to equity return 
change over the life of a project, is best estimated by the internal rate of return (IRR), 
which can be calculated as the cash flows of capital to and from the project. This 
discussion is followed by a look at limitations of the discount theory. Fourth, a recent P3 
example demonstrates how the proposed framework better compares the procurement 
options. The benefits of using the proposed framework and this discount rate to valuate 
the procurement decision are illustrated. A critical look at the Sea-to-Sky Highway 
Improvement project provides a conclusion. This example of a P3 is evaluated for both 
Partnerships BC' s valuation technique used for the project, as well as the model 
suggested by this paper. The findings of this paper are that the methodology based on 
discounting using the cost of capital, estimated as the IRR, more accurately describe the 
valuation needed. The IRR provides a justifiable discount rate to value the foregone 
payments to a P3 and thereby value the procurement decision based on net benefits to the 
government. 
Defining a P3 
There are many definitions for a P3. The Canadian Council of Public and Private 
Partnerships calls a P3 a cooperative venture between the public and private sectors, built 
on the expertise of each partner, that best meets clearly defined public needs through the 
appropriate allocation of resources, risks, and rewards. The National Council for Public 
Private Partnerships (US) defines it as the following: 
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a contractual agreement between a public agency (federal, state, or local) and 
a private sector entity. Through this agreement, the skills and assets of each 
sector (public and private) are shared in delivering a service or facility for the 
use of the general public. In addition to the sharing of resources, each party 
shares in the risks and rewards potential in the delivery of the service and/or 
facility. 
The Central Public Private Partnerships Unit (Ireland) refers to P3s as 
a contractual arrangement between the public and private sectors (consistent 
with a broad range of possible partnership structures) with clear agreement on 
shared objectives for the delivery of public infrastructure and/or public 
services by the private sector that would otherwise have been provided through 
traditional public sector procurement. 
The Partnerships BC definition of a P3 is a legally binding contract between government 
and business for the provision of assets and the delivery of services. The contract 
allocates responsibilities and business risks among the various partners. All definitions 
use the same terminology with respect to contractual arrangements and allocation of risk; 
however, for the purpose of this paper, the Partnerships BC definition is used. 
In a typical P3 , the government and the private consortium design, build, own, and run 
the physical assets required for delivery of the service. This contrasts with traditional 
public sector provision where the government builds or purchases physical assets, retains 
ownership, and uses public sector employees or a private contractor to deliver the 
required service (Grout, 2002). In this paper, a P3 occurs when the government contracts 
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a private consortium to build and maintain public infrastructure for a service fee for the 
horizon ofthat project.' 
Rationale for a P3 
The P3 model is gaining popularity as an alternative to a long history of private 
franchising with national and international governments. Historically, both Canada and 
the US have used public subsidies for large-scale infrastructure (Vining et al. , 2005). 
North American, European, and Australian governments have been most attracted to a P3 
in capital-intensive areas such as transportation, water, and wastewater management to 
minimize the use of public capital (Norment, 2002). The definition of infrastructure in 
this paper includes both "hard" (bricks and mortar) projects and "soft" services (such as 
community services and financial management) that have traditionally been provided by 
the public sector (Norment, 2005). Close linkages between the public and private sectors 
re-emerged in the US and Canada in the mid-1990s in the form of a formal agreement 
versus private franchising known as a P3 (Vining et al., 2005). The province of British 
Columbia (BC) and Partnerships BC2 is using the P3 model for nine different 
infrastructure projects in British Columbia totaling more than $3.4 billion. Of these 
projects, three are now in operation, including the transportation related project, the 
1 There are many complex forms of P3s. This paper focuses on the most basic of models. 
2 
Partnerships BC serve as the BC government's center for establishing policies and best practices for 
partnership projects in the province of British Columbia. Their advisory role provides planning services to 
public sector agencies wishing to explore P3 options for building and managing public infrastructure. Their 
mandate is to facilitate, and, in some cases, manage partnerships on behalf of public sector agencies. 
4 
Sierra Yoyo Desan, and two health care projects, the Academic Ambulatory Care Centre 
and Abbotsford Regional Hospital and Cancer Centre. With five more P3 projects 
already in procurement and six more going into operation, this trend of infrastructure 
delivery shows no signs of slowing. 
Many governments are in favor of moving to the P3 model of procurement for any 
number of the following five reasons (Pollitt et al. , 2001 ). The first reason revolves 
around containing public sector debt. If private finances are used, taxpayer funds can be 
used for other projects. Second, many believe that a P3 can provide both infrastructure 
and on-going services at a lower cost. This remains a heated and unresolved argument, 
however. Valuing the costs associated with these differences means, the discount rate 
used is absolute when determining the better procurement strategy. Third, transferring 
risk from the public to the private sector is critical because risk is better absorbed by the 
private sector than managed by the public sector. Fourth, governments want to avoid up-
front cost. By transferring financing to the private consortium, the public sector can pay 
a smaller nominal fee rather than a large initial capital outlay. Lastly, user fees are better 
implemented through the private sector, as the government risks political costs for 
implementing such tolls. The first two reasons involve financing costs; the next three 
relate to the relative non-financing costs of the public versus private sector delivery of 
infrastructure. 
Some of the reasons presented above overstate the benefits of a P3. Vining et al. (2005) 
find the first rationale valid only in the short term. They argue that the benefits from 
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foregoing the whole value of the investment are mitigated by the servicing costs agreed to 
by the partnership. Therefore, while short-term budgets are not affected by this decision, 
future budgets would require accounting. The second rationale posited by Pollitt et al. 
(200 1) has been contested because it fails to consider pricing based on the cost of capital. 
Basing savings on efficiencies in scale and technical capabilities rather than the cost of 
capital suggests a flaw in the logic of project pricing. These arguments are the subject of 
much ofthe reviewed literature. 
This argument can be resolved by considering the procurement decision after making the 
investment decision. Should the government acquire an asset through traditional 
procurement methods or pay someone else a service fee to have it delivered to the end 
user? Literature in this area often focuses on the investment decision. We argue that the 
procurement decision is, in fact, an investment decision: the government either uses 
public provisions or invests in a public-private partnership. In this decision, government 
defines a project by the attributes delivered to the end-user over the life of the project. 
Government then attempts to quantify these attributes by having the private sector bid on 
the project. The cost differences between public provision and a public-private 
partnership are calculated over the life of the project to yield a net cost for either option. 
Finally, the government needs to determine the discount rate appropriate for valuing the 
costs of these two decisions. This requires both a methodology to calculate the discount 
rate and a relevant framework for valuing the procurement decision. 
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CHAPTER2 
Literature Review- The Importance of the Discount Rate 
The sensitivity of the financial analysis of public provision versus P3 means the discount 
rate is an important test criterion in this analysis. P3s are economically sound because 
they decrease costs by transferring risks, avoid large upfront costs, and have other 
financial and non-financial benefits. Given this, the standard test criterion for a P3 
monetary: does it cost less than conventional public provision (Grout, 2002)? The 
problem of comparison arises when cost cash flows under traditional procurement occur 
immediately or within a relatively short period. In P3 procurements, the private 
contractor is paid a servicing fee over an extended period; therefore, cash flows cannot be 
easily compared to traditional cash flows for the same project. This is a major reason the 
quality of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) varies widely in government (Moore et al. , 2004). 
Whether public sector projects should be discounted at a rate lower than equivalent 
private sector projects has been the subject of much discussion. This is partly because the 
discount rate is a factor in determining the procurement model. As Shaffer (2002) 
argues, the difference in the rate he supports at 5% versus the rate used for the Sea-to-Sky 
project (P3) by Partnerships BC of 7.5% adds almost $10 million per year for the 25-year 
debt repayment period. Much of the literature details arguments that either refute or agree 
with Arrow and Lind's preposition that government financing is more cost effective than 
private financing (Klein, 1996). Arrow and Lind ( 1970) made the formal argument that 
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there is no risk premium for public investment in projects with returns uncorrelated with 
aggregate income. They al so argued that the public sector can pool and spread risk over 
several projects; taxpayers are mutually independent and therefore have a risk premium 
close to zero, otherwise known as the borrowing rate of government. The private sector, 
in Arrow and Lind ' s (2005) opinion, does not have this ability; therefore, it would have to 
charge a discount rate higher than that of the government to account for added risk, a risk 
premium. This view has been criticized by others, who argue that the private sector can 
pool risks, and the nature of risks in the public sector make them unlikely to be 
independent of each other and of private investments (Grout, 2002). One shortcoming 
seen by Grant and Quiggin (2002) is that the Arrow-Lind argument relies implicitly on 
the existence of market failure but does not mention how market failure arises. Klein 
( 1996) comments that Arrow and Lind (1970), while they mention risk pooling, make no 
mention of risk spreading. His argument is that any advantage the government may have 
in pooling diverse risks can be transferred to the private sector by privatizing the projects 
in question (Klein, 1996). Klein (1996) feels that the private sector can also tap into 
lower funds and will resolve any tradeoffs. He also argues that the private sector is more 
efficient than the government at maintaining project discipline. In Klein ' s (1996) 
opinion, government costs are based more on coercive powers versus a superior system 
of exploiting low cost risk bearing investors. Grout (2002) refutes the Arrow and Lind 
(1970) argument, stating that, in theory and accounting for tax adjustments, individuals 
should be able to divest themselves of their risks at market prices whether these arise in 
the public or private sector. Grout (2002), however, supports Arrow and Lind, claiming 
that if the former is true, arguments for higher discount rates for private projects must rest 
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with imperfections in the market. Vining et al. (2005) provide the most neutral analysis, 
stating that it is unclear if governments are generally able to borrow at a lower cost than 
the private sector. 
Other literature reviewed provided different methodologies for calculating or interpreting 
the discount rate. Grant and Quiggin (2002) use the Arrow and Lind (1970) argument to 
focus on problems arising from adverse selection rather than the moral hazards of risk 
spreading. According to Grant and Quiggin, because taxation is not voluntary, adverse 
selection problems can be overcome, but moral hazards cannot. Looking at errors and 
their impact on welfare analysis, Grant and Quiggin (2002) also show that privatization 
may reduce public sector net worth because a reduction in social welfare associated with 
privatization must be balanced against any improvements in operating efficiency. 
Burgess ( 1988) takes a different approach on public investment with his focus on 
complementarity and the discount rate. He argues two equivalent procedures for 
evaluating public investment in the private sector. First, the benefit of public investment 
includes its direct marginal productivity, which is then discounted at a rate that reflects 
the social opportunity cost of resources withdrawn from the private sector because of the 
project (Burgess, 1988). This discount rate is sensitive to the complementary, 
independent, or interchangeable relationship of public and private investment. Second, 
the benefit of public investment includes its direct marginal productivity plus any net 
external effects on distorted markets. These benefits are discounted at a rate that reflects 
the social opportunity cost of government borrowing. 
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Belli (1997) looks at the discount rate issue as one that involves time preference for 
consumption and social return. He argues that the cost of capital for the public sector is 
usually higher than the private sector cost of capital because the cost is the weighted 
average of the social marginal productivity of capital in the private sector and the social 
rate of time preference for consumption. He validates this argument by comparing the 
private after-tax return to the social return (which is lower), and the marginal return to 
"savers," which is lower than the social return. Belli (1997) uses this argument to help 
governments determine if society benefits from government involvement in the provision 
of goods. Moore et al. (2004) consider the intergenerational impact of the discount rate 
and the effect public investment has on crowding out private investment. Although there 
are several discount rates listed via a decision flow chart, the focus here is primarily on 
exogenous variables related to social opportunity cost and market behavior to capital 
investments. Moore et al. (2004) suggest using a method of social discounting where one 
would shadow price investment flows and then discount the resulting consumption 
equivalents based on the consumption-based social discount rate. 
With the exception of Grout (2002), Jenkinson (2003), and Shaffer (2005), the literature 
reviewed focuses on the initial decision of whether to invest in public infrastructure. 
Arrow and Lind (1970) use their argument of risk spreading and pooling to highlight the 
welfare of the government related to the investment decision to invest. Grant and 
Quiggin (2002) use the same argument to highlight the implicit effect of market failures 
and argue the negative net effect of privatization on social welfare. Vining et al. (2005), 
Belli (1997), and Moore et al. (2004) emphasize the importance of calculating discount 
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rates with consideration of social consumption, intergenerational impacts, and social 
opportunity costs. Klein ( 1996) first poses the question that has received little to no 
focus . Klein ( 1996) asks who is in a better place to bear financial risk - taxpayers or 
investors. This point of separation between the decision to invest versus which 
investment vehicle to use (public provision or P3) is somewhat indistinct. Klein (1996) 
himself speaks more to the role of government in reducing risk for all projects through 
efficient monetary policies; he spends little time exploring the more pertinent financial 
analysis needed to make the procurement decision. Grout (2002) differs from other 
scholars because of his use of the Gorman polar model to argue that it is inappropriate to 
use the same discount rate for the public and private sectors. Grout (2002) looks at the 
relationship between the effects of discount rates on government costs versus private 
sector payments made via quantities and a fixed payment schedule. Using the Gorman 
polar model, however, restricts many externalities by assuming that all individuals face 
the same prices in the market. Jenkinson (2003) provides more insight with his focused 
look at private sector involvement in a P3 as two distinct elements: operational and 
financial. Looking at the pure provision of private sector finance, Jenkinson argues that 
while there are conditions where public and private finance will be similar; these 
conditions are unlikely to hold for many public services (Jenkinson, 2003). Jenkinson 
(2003) also argues that the use of private sector finance is preferable because the private 
sector may better evaluate risks than does the public sector. This paper resembles 
Jenkinson ' s because of its use of the principles of finance to strengthen the argument. In 
his paper, Jenkinson ' s (2003) argument involves the following steps. First, he argues that 
changing the way the infrastructure is financed will not add any value unless something 
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'real ' is affected (based on the works by Modigliani and Miller [ 1958) and the weighted 
average cost of capital). Second, the argument is made that equity (not just debt) exists in 
all financing structures; government should account for the risk associated with this 
equity provided by the taxpayers, reserves, or government guarantees, even when it is 
difficult to measure (based on the capital asset pricing model introduced by Sharpe 
(1964) and Lintner ( 1965)). The third argument is that the public sector cost of capital is 
greater than private finance because of equity risks. Finally, Jenkinson (2003) argues 
that incomplete contracts increase the cost of private finance; some risks are not easily 
contractible or defined. Jenkinson (2003) provides strong but incomplete examples of 
analysis based on financial theory. Using a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPY) to extract 
cash flows and thereby separate risk analysis from the operational elements of risk is a 
plausible action. However, this action does not offer insight into pricing risk when it is 
not possible to separate operational and financial elements. Even Jenkinson (2003) 
mentions that it is often difficult to achieve a clear division between operational and 
financial risks based on the commonality of performance-based contracts and continued 
solvency of the operating company. The operational and financing elements, therefore, 
need to be considered together when pricing risk, as they determine the underlying risk 
associated with the infrastructure under consideration. 
The decision to invest is theoretically distinct from the decision to use public provision or 
a P3 arrangement. To illustrate this point, we consider a public infrastructure that can be 
procured through either pub I ic provision or a P3. It is helpful to think of the specific 
example of a bridge being considered to bypass a longer, riskier alignment of road. The 
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public sector can either build the bridge itself or engage a consortium of private sector 
agencies to build the bridge and maintain it for some duration . The risks associated with 
making the decision to invest would include, but not be limited to, the following : social 
opportunity cost of using public funds, political risk associated with not building the 
bridge, and environmental risks associated with the affected area. The benefits of such an 
undertaking would include the following: more efficient flow of traffic, timesaving to 
commuters, reduced accidents or fatalities , and political goodwill. Most of the risks and 
transferable noted are not immediately tangible; nonetheless, they represent real risks that 
need to be considered when evaluating the investment decision. This paper argues, 
however, that the risks mentioned do not transfer to the procurement decision. Once the 
decision to invest has been made, the decision of whether to use public provision or a P3 
inherently involves a new set of risks and therefore a different discount rate and do not 
take into consideration social costs and benefits. Shaffer (2005) argues that factors like 
the private sector investment disci pi ine and social investment criteria relate to the 
decision to invest. In his paper, the decision of whether to invest in the Sea-to-Sky3 
project has already been made, and taxpayers will assume that responsibility regardless of 
the investment vehicle chosen (Shaffer, 2005). Using the example of the bridge, once the 
decision to invest in the bridge has been made, the risks to be priced include those 
inherent to the underlying risk of choosing public provisions versus a P3 arrangement. 
Risks involved in the procurement decision are numerous and can include: construction 
risk (delays), procurement of resources, price sensitivity of materials, design risks 
(improper fits) , miscalculation of load bearing capacities, failure to consider traffic 
3 The Sea-to-Sky Project is a 95km section of Highway 99 from West Vancouver to Whistler in BC, 
Canada. The P3 is a Design-Build-Finance-Operate being undertaken through a 25-year performance 
partnership with the Province. It can be viewed on the Partnerships BC website. 
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patterns, financial risks (solvency of the partner), claims, funds availability (if the project 
should be delayed to future fiscals) , and political risk (administrative policy, and 
legislative decision that can effect the cost of the project). It is clear from the example 
above that these risks are inherently different from those that would be used in the 
investment decision . We do not wish to discuss whether the investment should be made; 
rather, we focus on the calculation of risks associated with the public sector investment in 
infrastructure. Unlike Moore et al. (2004), we do not assign a specific discount rate, but 
instead provide a model with which to evaluate the discount rate for the procurement 
decision. 
CHAPTER3 
Methodology 
The methodology for calculating the discount rate in the procurement decision is as 
follows . Section I defines risk within the context of the procurement decision. It uses the 
example of a Design-Build-Operate-Finance (DBFO) P3 to capture the risks associated 
with the procurement decision. The risks are categorized as transferable and non-
transferable. In Section II, we identify the most applicable method with which to 
calculate these risks. The importance of equivalency of the total risk to both the public 
and private sector is illustrated, and a detailed discussion of the theory of discount rates is 
provided. The shortcomings of WACC are illustrated by an IRR that evaluates net cash 
flows, providing a revenue stream with which to solidify the procurement decision. In 
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Section Ill , the limitations of the discount rate theory are identified. Section IV provides a 
recent example of a P3 arrangement used to provide a practical framework for using the 
discount rate to evaluate the procurement decision. 
I. Defining Risk in the Procurement Decision 
Investment risk is concerned with the range of possible outcomes from an investment. 
The greater the range, the greater the risk (Higgins, 2004). In some investments, the risk 
involved can be calculated objectively from scientific or historical evidence. History can 
be used to predict future outcomes. However, given the complexity and uniqueness often 
involved with a P3 , estimating risk becomes more of a challenge. In this situation, risk 
appraisal often depends on the perceptions of the decision makers, their knowledge of 
economics of the industry, and their understanding of the investment's ramifications 
(Higgins, 2004). This subjectivity lends itself to differing opinions regarding risk and the 
procurement decision. Risks differ as the proposed project differs, but can be categorized 
in the following categories: transferable risk, including construction risks, operational 
risks, and financial risks; and nontransferable risks, including economical, informational , 
and political. The risks that are transferable will vary from project to project and will 
depend on project circumstances, the P3 deal and the willingness of the P3 market to 
accept the risk at reasonable cost. To facilitate this discussion, a popular model of P3, 
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DBF04, applied to the preceding bridge example, is used to capture these categorical 
risks. 
A DBFO involves the delivery of infrastructure and therefore highlights construction 
risks. Although there is relatively little written on this subject, identification of 
construction risks involves simple concepts. In the United Kingdom, the HM treasury 
uses a document entitled The Greenbook: Appraisal and Evaluation in Central 
Government (2003), and refers to construction risk as the risk that the construction of 
physical assets will not be completed on time to budget and to specifications. These risks 
could include extraneous unaccounted costs that could range from lost profits, 
performance claims, and ramifications to goodwill. Using our example, construction risks 
can be further subdivided into the following: design, geotechnical investigations, 
construction costs, construction safety, environmental issues, unexpected site conditions, 
traffic management, etc. These risks are not mutually exclusive; adverse conditions in 
one area can affect others. All risks identified under construction are real risks that are 
transferable to both a public sector service delivery or business unit or the P3 consortium. 
This highlights the fact that regardless of who delivers the final infrastructure, both the 
public sector and the P3 consortium face the same construction risks. The difference lies 
more with how these risks are managed within each group. 
A DBFO involves the ongoing maintenance and operation of the infrastructure delivered 
and therefore highlights the operational risks of the project. Operational risk does not 
4 In the DBFO P3 model, the private sector designs, finances, and constructs a new facility under a long-
term lease, and operates the facility during the term of the lease. The P3 consortium transfers the new 
facility to the public sector at the end of the lease term. 
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include market risk or credit risk. Theories on operational risks relate largely to financial 
institutions, although we can borrow these concepts, as they apply to any organization in 
business. The Bank for International Settlements illustrates these risks in a document 
entitled Basel 11, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards (2004), also known as The New Accord. This document is a collection of 
recommendations advising the banking regime of changes to international standards for 
measuring the adequacy of capital. Operational risk in this document is defined as the risk 
of monetary loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people, and 
systems, or from external events (Basel , 2004). Much like construction risk, it is difficult 
to identify or assess levels of operational risk and its main sources. In this paper, 
operational risk can include, but is not limited to, the following: changes m traffic 
composition, changes in required standards, equipment availability, and latent effects. As 
much ofthe operational risk is tied to the construction process, a timeline must be used to 
separate the two categories. The example used to test our model shows incentives in 
operations between the public sector and the P3 consortium in the performance-based 
contract. This risk does not differ significantly from construction because it is easy to 
argue its applicability to either the public sector or the P3 consortium. The P3 
consortium considers operational risk a real cost to the project. Adverse effects resulting 
from poor construction or design lead to decreased profitability. Project profitability is 
derived from cash flows that, in many cases, have already been accounted for as 
performance-based incentives in contracts. The public sector view of operational 
management IS similar to that of ongoing maintenance of public infrastructure; 
deficiencies represent large costs to taxpayers and need to be managed accordingly. Poor 
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construction or design produce budgetary pressures that are often difficult to manage in a 
system where funding (government) is based on voted appropriations.5 
Financial risks are critical risks to a DBFO, given its direct application to the value of the 
project. By their nature, investments require the expenditure of money in anticipation of 
uncertain future benefits (Higgins, 2004). At an applied level , risks increase the 
uncertainty of cash flows and make it difficult to estimate cash flows. It is important to 
understand the return needed on an investment and the investment value needed to 
support the risk taken. Financial risks often serve as precursors to any other risks 
mentioned in the timeline; an understanding of financial implications is needed before 
any decisions about a contract can be made. Uncertainty is a cost; lenders and 
shareholders (private or public) want a higher return when the outcome of future cash 
flows is uncertain. The assumption here is one that is largely applied in financial theory. 
Given two investments that promise the same expected return but have differing risks, 
most people prefer the low-risk alternative (Higgins, 2004). This theory is backed by the 
psychology of risk. Financial risk can involve a more scientific financial approach to 
decision-making than is possible with construction and operational risks. Financial risks 
usually involve calculating inflation, interest rates, and financing costs and risk associated 
with a given project. Information is often generally available via stock indices and 
market prices for various financial instruments. Revisiting our discussion on Jenkinson 's 
(2003) paper, we also see that financial risk is not mutually exclusive from either 
construction or operational risk, as the role it plays in determining the value of the project 
5 The author speaks to the current provincial practice of funding projects annually, versus multi-year 
contracts based on project management experience. 
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is interdependent. Financial risks are real risks to the public sector as well. Jenkinson ' s 
(2003) look at the National Air Traffic services P3 shows that governments often face 
challenges with internal debt consumption and are averse to multi-year programs. 
Increases in the cost of materials and labor also pose challenges when projects are not 
completed within the fiscal year; forecasting such changes after project implementation is 
often a daunting task. Government should take a more critical look at the value these 
infrastructures bring to the taxpayers and ensure it is using the most cost-effective 
approach possible. 
Economic, informational , and political risk are nontransferable risks in the procurement 
decision. In the broadest sense, economical risks are brought about either by future 
practices of the government or economic changes in industry and, therefore, the 
economy. Engaging in or insuring one from these risks could be costly. Political risk is 
also evident, as both parties cannot predict the future for the often long contractual 
tenures of a P3. Current government policies may not be followed by future government 
practices and exercising or implementing changes in certain types of laws could have 
positive or negative affects on both the public and private sector. The respective 
government often supports these projects, while ministries or federal organizations (as 
would be the case in Canada) often administrate the respective projects over the life of 
the contract. The Sea-to-Sky Highway improvement project is a P3 contract between the 
Ministry of Transportation (MoT), the S2S Transportation Group (S2S), and not the 
Provincial governing party of the time (Project Report, 2005). The risks borne from the 
P3 in the Sea-to-Sky example are therefore borne to MoT and the S2S group. While both 
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parties share in these economic and political risks, the risks are not transferable by MoT 
to the S2S group, but are shared. Informational risk is risk associated with the project 
that may be absent or unknown at the time of the P3 arrangement. An example of this 
could be a sub-surface slide that shows no signs of distress and therefore goes undetected 
during normal geotechnical investigations. This is obviously not the fault of any party, 
but significant cost pressures could ensue. Using the absence of vital geotechnical 
information in the Sea-to-Sky example, the risk borne from matters such as conditions 
below the highway surface are shared; it is outlined that it is the MoT's responsibility to 
provide accurate data, and the responsibility of S2S to interpret it (Project Report, 2005). 
Much like the construction and operational risks, these nontransferable risks are difficult 
to measure and rely more on subjectivity and managerial input than on any one scientific 
theory. 
The associative risks involved in the procurement decision using a DBFO have been 
clearly identified. The value of these risks is anecdotally important; however, it is the 
measurement and valuation of these risks by way of the appropriate discount rate model 
that are of importance to this paper. 
II. Calculating the Discount Rate in the Procurement Decision 
The discount rate in the procurement decision can be estimated as the IRR of the P3 
partner's cash flows to and from the project. This paper first illustrates how in making 
the procurement decision the public and private sectors face comparable circumstances. 
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Second, it shows how the discount rate can be calculated as the IRR of the cash flows for 
the P3 project to and from the providers of capital. 
11.1 Calculating Total Risk in the Procurement Decision 
Transferable risks cannot be valued independently of each other during the procurement 
decision. In defining these risks, this paper has illustrated how adverse conditions in one 
area can ultimately affect multiple variables. Jenkinson (2003) exemplifies this point in 
his look at the project to refurbish the HM Treasury. Jenkinson (2003) states that even 
though the risks associated with this project were essentially construction costs and 
maintenance costs, the costs of these risks were passed to the SPY (Exchequer) through 
construction contracts and service agreements. The reverse is also true: financial costs 
can affect construction and operational risks in the procurement decision. Increased 
financial risks can jeopardize the profitability of the company and therefore lead to 
increased construction and operational risks. Vining et al. (2005) use the example of the 
Dulles Greenway P3 to illustrate how raising tolls to cover the financing and operating 
costs discouraged usage and led the company into default only six months after it opened. 
Efforts were made to lower tolls, whereby demand increased; however, total revenues did 
not increase enough to cover the financing and operating costs, ultimately leading to the 
bankruptcy of the company and government intervention. It is clear from the above 
examples that risks should be considered collectively, rather than independently. 
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Nontransferable risks are constants in the total risk calculation. The risks mentioned in 
this paper are largely transferable and are often shared by both the public and private 
sector in a P3 model , and can be assumed to equivalents in the calculation of risks when 
comparing P3 with traditional procurement through a public sector business unit. 
Usually, the risks that are not transferred are those that neither party can control , such as 
the economic, political , and latent defect risks associated with the project. This is why 
the P3 arrangement for the Sea-to-Sky project presents such risks as retained or shared, 
rather than transferred or retained by any one party (Project Report, 2005) . 
The private sector evaluation of risk is reflected in the valuation of the proposed project. 
There is little disagreement as to whether the private sector values risk in its project 
proposals. Private investments take many forms and usually carrying a mixture of debt 
and equity. Backed by a consortium of large lenders and private shareholders, the private 
sector takes an arguably more critical look at the expected rate of return. In the Sea-to-
Sky Project (2005), the cost of capital relative to the government-borrowing rate has a 
premium of 2.5%. The premium could reflect not only the risks associated with the 
project, but also some form of compensation in excess of these costs that would provide a 
return on equity to shareholders for the additional risk borne (Shaffer, 2005). This seems 
logical, as part of the rationale for a P3 earlier is the optimal transfer of risk to the private 
sector, a risk that would have to be compensated. 
For the purposes of determining the appropriate discount rate, we assume risk allocated to 
a public sector business unit are the same as those allocated to the private sector. This 
22 
assumption is based on the discussion above and a focused look at the total risk equation 
presented next. As this paper considers projects that are often unique in nature, we need 
to view these infrastructures (assets) in isolation and address the risks accordingly. The 
public sector business unit, like the private sector, has two types of risk to consider, as is 
illustrated in the following equation: 
Equation 1, Total Risk of Asset, Higgins (2004): 
Total Risk of Asset = Nondiversifiable Risk + Diversifiable Risk 
An asset 's risk in isolation is its total risk; its risk as part of a portfolio is its 
nondiversifiable risk. The risk remaining after the asset has been diversified is known as 
diversifiable risk. The portion of an asset's total risk that is nondiversifiable depends on 
the correlation of its returns with market returns (Higgins, 2004 ). When the correlation is 
high, nondiversifiable risk is a large fraction of total risk, and vice versa (Higgins, 2004). 
Adapting this equation to the procurement decision, the risk premiums investors will 
require before they will invest in a project arises from the nondiversifiable component of 
transferable risk. The relevant risks can be expressed in the following equation: 
Equation 2, Total Risk of Project: 
Total Risk 
Of Project 
Transferable 
Risk 
+ Nontransferable 
Risk 
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In addition, Equation 3, Transferable Risk: 
Transferable 
Risk 
A Nondiversifiable A Diversifiable + 
Component Component 
Intuitively, this equation makes sense and according to standard finance theory, the risk 
premium is paid to investors for assuming the nondiversifiable component. Both the 
public and private sector have a portfolio of projects with which they gauge the overall 
risk-reward characteristics; this is in comparison to merely compiling portfolios from 
securities that individually have attractive risk-reward characteristics (Markowitz, 1952). 
The public sector would also expect to earn this risk premium because it has a multitude 
of other projects and assets that would offer it similar risk-reward tradeoffs and from 
which it could earn a market rate of return on behalf of the taxpayers. The private sector 
consortium, although often brought together specifically for this venture, can also have 
other securities with which to measure this tradeoff within its portfolio. That is, the 
private sector can also hold other equity investments in its portfolio; one venture may be 
but a smaller subset of a larger collection of projects. A diversifiable risk, therefore, 
represents the risk that one is able to reduce from the portfolio by way of diversification, 
and nondiversifaible risks are the risks that remain after this has taken place. These two 
variables represent the total risk to the asset in consideration. 
The P3 is a business opportunity that is assumed to take on all the transferable risks. The 
public sector has the option of transferring these risks to a P3 in exchange for delivery of 
a service. Some of those transferable risks could be retained by the public sector, but by 
definition, the real benefit lies with transferring these risks to the P3. If these transferable 
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risks are not transferred to a P3 , they would remain with the government (and the value to 
government of the deal will be reduced). This highlights the importance of equivalency. 
The public sector, through traditional procurement and through an internal business unit, 
would retain the total risk to the project. It is the risks that the public sector can transfer 
to the P3 that provides value to the government. 
Adapting this equation for the procurement decision, we can use equations 2 and 3 to 
obtain the following: 
Starting with equation 2 
2. Total Risk of Project = Transferable Risk+ Nontransferable Risk 
Use equation 3 to obtain equations 4a and 4b, Total Risk to Procurement Decision 
(Detailed) as follows: 
Traditional Procurement 
Risk Transferable Risk Diversifiable Nondiversifiable 
4a. (Risks :or pu~lic sect~r business =(But not transferred) =Component +Component 
or service delivery umt) 
4b. 
Total Risk of 
Project to P3 
Private Partner 
Transferred 
= Risk 
Diversifiable Nondiversifiable 
+ Component Component 
Equations 4a and 4b show that the risks assumed in traditional procurement by a public 
sector service delivery unit can for the purposes of this discussion be assumed to be 
comparable to the risks assumed by a P3 partner. Recall that the procurement decision 
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involves the comparison of what is more cost effective to deliver public provision or a 
P3 . Using Equation 5, below we see that the public sector should base this decision on 
fact that the total risks for both the public sector business unit and private sector partner 
are similar. As mentioned , these transferable risks would continue to exist even if the 
public sector chose to use public provisions. The nontransferable risk is shared, not 
transferred. If the total risk involved for traditional procurement is equal to the value of 
the total risk of the P3 option, then we can rewrite Equation 3 as follows: 
Equation 5, Total Risk to Procurement Decision (Equivalency): 
Traditional P3 
Procurement Option 
Transferred 
Risk 
Diversifiable Nondiversifiable 
Component + Component 
Where risks to the public sector are substantially the same as those associated with a P3 
option. These risks determine the discount rate used to define the cost of capital. 
11.11 Discount Rate Theory 
This section illustrates how the risks evaluated in the previous section affect the premium 
portion of the discount equation. The expected return (discount rate) on the project is 
priced using a modified capital asset pricing model with the following determinants: the 
government-borrowing rate and a risk premium to account for the additional return 
required by taxpayers for a risky asset. 
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The discount rate for the procurement decision is often calculated using a modified 
version of the capital asset pricing model. Introduced by Sharpe (I 964 ), Lintner ( 1965), 
and Moss in ( 1996) independently, the capital asset model (CAPM) is a common method 
to price an asset ' s discount rate or expected return on the market. CAPM is used to 
determine a theoretically appropriate price of an asset given that assets non-diversifiable 
risk. The CAPM formula has as its components a risk-free rate (interest rate on 
government bonds), the asset' s sensitivity to non-diversifiable risk in the form of a beta 
(also known as transferable and nontransferable risk), and an expected return to the 
additional risk born (known as a premium) (Sharpe, 1964). This formula is shown below: 
Equation 6, CAPM, Higgins (2004): 
Expected Return 
On a Risky Asset 
Interest Rate on 
Government Bonds 
+ 13-Risk 
Asset 
* Risk Premium 
Where ~-risk asset is defined as the asset's volatility and the risk premium is "the 
increased return on a security required for compensating investors for the risk born" 
(Higgins, 2004). The interest rate on government bonds (or respective risk-free 
instrument) can be sourced through various publications of financial government debt 
instruments. 
The total risk to the investment is not the risk premium. In the context of comparing the 
use of public provisions versus a PJ , this paper uses the total risk (transferable, 
nontransferable) to help value the underlying risk to the project. This value forms the 
total risk to the project, but not the premium. The premium is a measure of the cost ofthe 
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risk of the asset from the investor' s point of view. That is, if the total risk is seen as a 
cost, the investor will want to be rewarded for assuming this cost; the risk premium for a 
P3 is an additional return to investors for assuming the transferred, nondiversifiable risk. 
To calculate the ~-risk, we must understand the correlation of the asset return with the 
returns of a market portfolio. We would estimate the correlation using a list of prices for 
the asset and the respective index (or returns to the market portfolio of assets). In recent 
decades, ~-risk has become an important fact in security analysis, so much so that 
stockbrokers advise regularly with published ~-risk for all publicly traded companies 
(Higgins, 2004). 
Other financial theory considerations are important to mention within the context of this 
discussion . In calculating the cost of capital , Jenkinson (2003) uses Modigliani and 
Miller' s theory to prove that the overall cost of capital , the minimum required in a 
project, is independent of the method of financing. This principle rests on a number of 
assumptions, however, including tax implications, transaction costs, and financing used 
to overcome principal-agent costs and other forms of asymmetric information (Jenkinson 
2003). Many of these costs are real costs that complicate the theory provided. Agency 
costs exist because of the partnership evaluation and tax implications; while these costs 
do not have implications for government, they do have implications to the P3 consortium. 
Jenkinson (2003) supports the concept of valuing the cost structure of the firm. As 
Jenkinson (2003) argues, the cost of capital is determined by the underlying risks 
associated with the activity. However, the cost structure, with its equivalency of the 
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discount rate for both public and private sector, is also an important consideration. 
Jenkinson (2003) claims that equity exists in all public sector investments. He uses the 
example of a project buffer or existing funds with which to cover overruns as a form of 
equity. These monies do not differ from their practice in private sector projects; 
therefore, the risk-reward relationships of the taxpayers need to be accounted for in the 
discount rate. Jenkinson ' s (2003) argument would therefore illustrate the need to value 
both debt and equity within the discount rate equation. As the amount of debt and equity 
used in public sector project would differ, we would weight the respective costs 
according to their expected rates of return. 
Incorporating these theories, we rewrite the capital asset pricing model as follows: 
Equation 7, CAPM with Equity (Simplified), 
Expected Return 
On a Risky Asset 
Kd * D 
D + E 
Ke * E 
+ 
D+E 
Where Kd is the interest rate on bonds issued to finance the project, as the expected 
return on debt, and Ke consists of the ~-risk of the equity asset and its associated risk 
premium. This equation is quite similar to that of the weighted average cost of capital 
represented in Higgins (2004): 
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Equation 8, WACC, (Higgins 2004): 
WACC 
(1-t) * Kd * D 
D+E 
Ke * E 
+ 
D+E 
where t is the tax rate, Kd is the expected return on debt or the cost of debt, D is the 
amount of interest-bearing debt in the companies' capital structure, Ke is the expected 
(after tax) return on equity or the cost of equity, and E is the amount of equity in the 
companies' capital structure (Higgins, 2004). The annual return that the companies 
should earn on existing capital is therefore the weighted average costs of capital 
(W ACC). Equation 7 and Equation 8 therefore represent an equivalency minus the 
consideration of taxes on debt. This is predicated upon government financing of a 
project, as there would be no additional tax considerations with a governing body 
financing a public project. Therefore, companies W ACC would be equivalent to the 
expected return on a risky asset, considering the financial implications of equity within an 
investment and the proportionality representative to the overall weighted costs of capital. 
This is expressed formally in the following equation: 
Equation 9, Expected Return on a Risky Asset and W ACC (Equivalency), 
Expected Return 
On a Risky Asset 
= WACC 
(1-t) * Kd * D 
D + E 
Ke * E 
+ 
D+E 
A P3 consortium would use the project ' s internal rate of return (IRR) instead of the 
W ACC to value this business opportunity. Equation 9 shows the equivalency that exists 
between the CAPM and W ACC equation. However, a traditional P3 consortium would 
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not use the W ACC to value this business opportunity because of the debt to equity ratio 
of the project would not remain constant. Over the life of the project, the debt would be 
paid down more quickly than the decline of the enterprise value of the project. The 
W ACC calculated at the onset of the project would be different from the W ACC 
calculated throughout the project and would not adequately measure return on 
investment. To estimate the required cost of capital that the P3 should use, the P3 
consortium should calculate the IRR to the project. The IRR is the discount rate that gives 
a net present value of zero (Higgins, 2004). This equation is illustrated below: 
Equation I 0, IRR, Higgins (2004): 
NPV = 0 = (Capital Outlays)+ Payment Streams 
(I+ IRRIIOO)"'n 
Where NPV is net present value, IRR is the internal rate of return, and n is the number of 
payments over the life of the project (in years). As this is an investment decision, a P3 
consortium would need to know whether they should invest in this or another project. To 
do this, the IRR calculated for each opportunity is used to rate the alternative 
investments; the investment alternative with the highest IRR is preferable (Higgins, 
2004). The IRR is preferred to WACC for two reasons. First, the payment stream to the 
P3 consortium is relatively constant; second, there is minimal reinvestment into the cash 
flows of the project once completed. The IRR equation builds the time sensitivity needed 
to evaluate the cost of capital (discount rate) by averaging all the payment streams from 
the project. It is equal to an average of W ACCs calculated using a W ACC from each 
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payment period over the life of the project. The P3 consortium would therefore use the 
IRR instead of the WACC to evaluate this investment decision . 
The public sector should use as a discount rate the cost of capital calculated as the P3 
consortium ' s IRR. Equation 9 illustrates the equivalency between CAPM and WACC. 
Ordinarily a weighted average cost of debt and equity capital would work well as an 
estimated of the cost of capital. However, because in the case of an infrastructure P3, 
debt to equity ratios varies over the life of the project, the IRR provides a better estimate. 
The IRR is in effect a measure of W ACC, weighted for time periods and amount of 
capital. The IRR, therefore, provides a better measure of the required return on capital. 
The public sector therefore still needs a measure to evaluate its alternatives. To illustrate 
this point, we use the following model to present the respective costs to a project of using 
traditional procurement or a P3 consortium : 
Table 1: Valuation Model for the Procurement Decision 
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Project Costs ($ Millions) 
Traditional Procurement 
Capital Costs -X 
Operations & Maintenance Costs -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 
Rehabilatation Costs -5 -5 -5 -5 -5 
Expected Value of Costs -X -15 -15 -15 -15 -15 
P3 Consortium 
Payments to P3 Consortium -45 -45 -45 -45 -45 
I ($60M-$15M=$45M) 
P3 Consortium: Capital Cash Flows -100 30 30 30 30 30 
IRR of Cashflows to the Consortium 15% 
The Public Sector IRR 
20% 
if X is equal to $90 million 
The Public Sector IRR 
15% 
if X is equal to $100 million 
The Public Sector IRR 
12% 
if X is equal to $110 million 
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The above table is a simplified presentation, in actual application the low cost capital 
project would be much more difficult to identify. 
As seen in Table I, a traditional project would incur a large initial outlay, followed by 
smaller subsequent costs to service the project over its life. Ifthe government decided to 
use a P3 to deliver and service a project, it would incur payments to the P3 consortium 
over the same life of the project, but would forego the large initial outlays and servicing 
costs required to build and maintain the same project. The return therefore to an 
infrastructure investment, between using traditional procurement is the savings to the 
government during the operations period of not having to pay a P3 partner. If we were 
to take the public sector' s initial capital outlays and use the payment to the P3 consortium 
(less the public sector operating costs) as a revenue stream, then it is possible to calculate 
an IRR for the public sector investment. Framed this way the public sector's alternative 
to a P3 is to invest in public provision of infrastructure. This approach yields an IRR and 
government should choose public sector provision versus P3 based on the approach that 
yields a larger IRR. It, therefore follows that, when determining the public sector costs, 
one should use the IRR of the P3 consortium as a basis for doing comparisons with the 
present value of P3 procurement. 
In the example above, the private sector IRR for the project given is 15% based on this 
framework. It therefore follows that, if the public sector would have an IRR for the given 
project of less than 15%, the government obtains a positive net benefit by using a P3 . If 
on the other hand, the public sector has an IRR equivalent to that calculated for the 
private sector for the same investment, the public sector is indifferent to the procurement 
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decision (all other things being equal). Finally, if the public sector would have an IRR 
larger than the private sector partner' s lRR, the government should choose traditional 
procurement for obtaining the infrastructure, as there is a negative net benefit for using 
the P3 option. 
III. Limitations of the Discount Rate Model for the Procurement Decision 
First, the above model assumes that the all investors have rational expectations and are 
averse to risk. While there is a level of profitability that a P3 consortium would need to 
achieve to meet the requirements of its shareholders, this profitability would not be in 
amounts in excess of what a normal risk-averse taxpayer would require for a similar risk-
reward tradeoff. This model assumes that investors demand higher returns in exchange 
for higher risk and does not allow for investors who will accept lower returns for higher 
risks. Much of financial theory focuses on this risk-aversion relationship. In efforts to 
simplify this model , it does not account for taxes or transaction costs. Government 
decisions often do not consider taxes, although transaction costs could be real, given the 
agency relationship of P3 partnerships. Agency costs are not argued in detail ; however, 
they could be included as an additional risk in the procurement decision if deemed 
significant. This model also assumes that investors choose assets solely as a function of 
the risk-reward tradeoff and not because of personal preference. This premise speaks to 
the rationality of the investor and the relationship the investor has to the risk-reward 
relationship. Personal preference, government idealism, and managerial preference are all 
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risks that could be incorporated into the above model. However, they are not weighted 
heavily in Equation 10 or in the total risks to the project discussed earlier. 
IV. Evaluating the Procurement Decision 
This is an exercise in financial evaluation of the investment opportunity involving three 
discrete steps: estimating relevant cash flows, calculating a figure of merit for the 
investment, and comparing the figure of merit to an acceptance criterion (Higgins, 2004). 
Estimating relevant cash flows, at best, is often the most difficult challenge in financial 
evaluation (Higgins, 2004) . Difficulties can involve financing costs, working capital 
investments, excess capacity, contingent opportunities, and many important costs and 
benefits that cannot be measured in monetary terms (Higgins, 2004). This situation is 
also complicated by the fact that the cash flows under traditional and P3 procurement 
generally takes place over different time-periods and under different terms. To the public 
sector, these cash flows represent costs; to the private sector, these cash flows are revenue 
from the payments made to build, maintain, and/or service the infrastructure. To make 
the payment streams comparable, Partnerships BC uses a public sector comparator (PSC) 
to represent traditional procurement of similar infrastructures. Partnerships BC defines 
the public sector comparator as a means to estimate the public sector cost to procure a 
similar asset or service in the absence of a P3 (Project Report, 2005). The PSC is 
generally unique to the project and tries to match the payment streams to a P3 and a 
traditional procurement over the same period. This enables Partnerships BC to compare 
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the net present cost (NPC) or net present value (NPV), discounted for both options, to 
determine the most cost efficient procurement model. As an example, this figure of merit 
is illustrated in Table 2 in our discussion of the Sea-to-Sky highway improvement 
project. 
Higgins (2004) describes a figure of merit, as a number summarizing an investment is 
economic worth, comparable to the commonly used rate of return or, in this case, the 
discount rate. Partnerships BC use the net present value (NPV) cost adjusted for risk as a 
measure ofthe respective projects worth. 
The discount rate used by Partnerships BC to value the project is illustrated below: 
Equation II , Partnerships BC Discount Rate Equation, (Project Report, 2005) 
Discount Rate = Private Sector W ACC = Pub I ic Cost of Debt + Project Risk Premium 
Partnerships BC use the same discount rate as the private sector to value public 
investment. Partnerships BC argue that the public sector borrowing rate is not the 
appropriate measure to compare the PSC and the P3 . The public sector borrowing rate 
reflects the taxpayer-supported credit of the Province, whereas the weighted average cost 
of capital (W ACC), used by the private sector, reflects risk associated with the individual 
project (Project Report, 2005). S2S calculates its W ACC by weighting the marginal cost 
of each type of capital (i .e. , interest on debt and return on equity) against the proportion 
of that type of capital in the project ' s capital structure. According to Partnerships BC, the 
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W ACC better reflects the level of risk associated with the individual project, and the 
public sector when evaluating the cost of making payments to a P3 partner, versus 
traditional procurement, should use a discount rate that incorporates a risk premium to be 
comparable to the private sector (market) W ACC for the same project (Project Report, 
2005). 
Partnerships BC uses the private sector W ACC because that measure best reflects the cost 
of taking the risk that has been transferred under a particular P3 project (Project Report, 
2005). Even though the discount rate used by government is conceptually equal to the 
W ACC, calculating an IRR is a more practical way of estimating the W ACC over the life 
ofthe project. 
Using the Partnerships BC Model we see that P3 projects have been evaluated using the 
following acceptance criterion: 
Equation 12, The Financial Acceptance Criterion-Partnerships BC, (Project Report, 
2005): 
NPC of PSC > NPC of P3 = Procure through P3 
NPC of PSC < NPC of P3 = Procure through Public Provisions 
(All other things being equal). 
Equation 12 describes an acceptance criterion where the inequality function compares the 
cost to the public sector in present value (PV) terms for both delivery models, public 
provisions and a P3. The net lowest cost determines the delivery model , all other things 
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being equal. The net present cost (NPC) is the total cost to the project discounted at the 
market cost of capital for a project with this projects risk profile. 
Partnerships BC ' s model does support common valuation theory, as does Grout (2002), 
which looks at each project delivering a flow of benefits and costs. His cost benefit test 
would opt for public provision if the following were true: 
Equation 13 , P3 Acceptance Criterion-Theory, (Grout 2002): 
Benefit of Public 
Provision 
Cost of Public 
Provision 
> Benefit of P3 Cost ofP3 
Where the benefit mtnus the costs of public provision discounted to some rate 
respectively was greater than the benefits minus the costs of a P3 discounted to some rate. 
As the procurement decision values the costs of the risks involved, Grout (2002) proposes 
a pure finance based test to compare the cost to the government of public provision with 
the cost to the public sector of conducting the project as a P3: 
Equation 14, P3 Financial Acceptance Criterion-Theory, (Grout 2002): 
PV ofCost of Public Provision < PV of Cost ofPPP (Price*Quantity) 
When Equation 14 holds true, public provision is preferable; P3 is preferred if the 
inequality is reversed. Equation 14 is identical to Equation 12 ifwe think ofthe payment 
to the P3 consortium as a function of price and the amount of usage occurring through the 
infrastructure. 
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In this paper, we treat the procurement decision as a traditional project with a payment 
and revenue stream. The acceptance cri terion we use is as follows: 
Equation 15 , Acceptance Criterion-Paper: 
Net Benefit to Public 
Sector of Foregoing P3 
Net Benefit to Public 
Sector of Foregoing P3 
> 0 = 
< 0 
Procure through Public Provision 
Procure through P3 
Equation 15 represents the inequality that compares the total net benefit (in PV terms) to 
the public sector of foregoing the P3 partnerships. If the net benefit of foregoing the P3 
is positive, then foregoing a P3 procurement strategy is beneficial. If the net benefit is 
negative, the public sector is incurring a cost larger than the payments to a P3 and should 
proceed with a P3 procurement of public infrastructure. It is worth mentioning, that this 
acceptance criterion could be adapted to represent the inequalities between both the 
public sector and the P3 consortium IRR for a project. This paper chooses to use a net 
benefit analysis as it feel s an investor would be able to better recognize the net benefit if 
stated in nominal terms versus as a reflection of internal rate of return on capital cash 
flows . 
Again, if we refer to Table I, this acceptance criterion makes sense for a number of 
reasons. Government projects usually have a large initial capital outlay, followed by a 
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senes of smaller operational , maintenance, and rehabilitation costs.6 To make the 
payment streams more comparable for the purposes of discounting, we looked at the net 
difference of foregoing the P3 (i.e. , the payments to the P3 consortium). These additional 
savings are now treated as a revenue stream for this project. 
The central premise of the model is to identify a revenue stream with which to compare 
public provision to a P3. The opportunity cost of the foregone payments represents this 
revenue. The net value is the difference between the total stream of costs to the public 
sector under traditional delivery and the total stream of payments that would be made to 
the P3. This value is then discounted with Equation I 0 to achieve a NPV for the revenue 
stream. Using our acceptance criteria, if the net benefit is therefore positive, this 
represents governmental gain obtained by foregoing a P3 model. 
The model for evaluating the procurement decision and the discount rate presented in 
Equation 10 is used in the following P3 example. 
CHAPTER4 
Using the framework and discount theory discussed to evaluate the Sea-to-Sky P3 
The paper in this section proceeds as follows. In Section I, the Sea-to-Sky Highway 
improvements project is described. In Section II , the P3 example is defined as a 
6 These costs were reverted back to Future Value terms to demonstrate the payment stream spread over the 
25-year term of the project. 
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procurement decision . In Section III , the risks associated with the underlying value of the 
project are identified. In Section IV, we use the investment evaluation technique 
(Higgins, 2004) to consider Partnerships BC' s evaluation of the procurement decision. In 
Section V, we further analyze this evaluation using both the framework presented within 
this paper and the discount rate equivalent to the P3 IRR. Section VI concludes with a 
discussion ofthe limitations ofthis assessment. 
I. The Sea-to-Sky Highway Project 
The Sea-to-Sky Highway is a 95-kilometer section of Highway 99 running from West 
Vancouver to Whistler. British Columbia' s (Canada) Ministry of Transportation (MoT) 
decided to make improvements to this section of highway to accommodate the following: 
population growth, economic development in corridor communities, increasing demand 
for resident and visitor travel , and increased goods movement (Project Report, 2005). 
The improvements, to be completed by 2009, include highway widening and 
straightening and other measures designed to reduce hazards, shorten travel times, and 
increase the capacity of the highway (Project Report, 2005). MoT decided to undertake 
two Design-Build (DB) contracts for a portion ofthe overall project to gain knowledge of 
geotechnical , constructability, and traffic management issues associated with the overall 
project. The remainder of the project procured under a DBFO because it added private 
sector financing, integrated a wider range of services, and transferred additional risks to 
the private sector (Project Report, 2005). A risk assessment estimated the potential cost 
of transferring certain risks to the private sector: capital cost risks, construction risks, 
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operating risks, maintenance risks, rehabilitation risks, financial risks, and traffic 
management risks. MoT established an annual affordability ceiling, detailed in the 
Request for Proposal (RFP) as the maximum price that MoT was prepared to pay for the 
private sector portion of the baseline highway improvements and for operations, 
maintenance, and rehabilitation of the entire corridor (Project Report, 2005). The final 
25-year performance-based contract was awarded to the S2S Transportation Group (S2S). 
The contract designates a standard payment for fulfilling contractual obligations, as well 
as financial incentives for meeting certain performance standards for project schedule, 
traffic management, and final asset conditions. 
II. The Procurement Decision in the Sea-to-Sky Highway Project 
In January 2003 , the Provincial Treasury Board approved a maximum $600 million 
capital commitment for improvements to the Sea-to-Sky Highway (Project Report, 2005). 
MoT subsequently advised the Treasury Board of its ability to provide the same project at 
a lower capital cost, but this does not effect the initial decision to invest. The Ministry 
decided to make improvements to the highway to meet the mandate and objectives of 
transportation in the Province. Partnerships BC were at that time helping MoT decides 
between two methods of delivery: public provision, or a DBFO P3 arrangement. This is 
the procurement decision discussed in this paper. 
III. Identification of Risks 
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Now that this paper has identified the procurement decision, we must identify the 
underlying risks associated with the delivery of this asset. The Project Report (2005) 
identifies the following risks to the project: capital cost, constructional , operational , 
maintenance, rehabilitation, and traffic management risks. Financial and inflationary risk 
are also identified and discussed later. 
There are additional risks not explicitly identified by the Project Report (2005). These 
risks include economic risk, informational risk, and political ri sk associated with the 
project. 
IV. Evaluation of the Procurement Decision- Partnerships BC 
Partnerships BC used the following to compare the cost efficiency of the two delivery 
systems: a series of design and build contracts tendered by MoT (the public service 
comparator, PSC) and a public private partnership using a DBFO structure. Cost cash 
flows were calculated for both the PSC and the P3 option, and a net present cost (NPC) 
valuation was rendered . Partnerships BC used the following acceptance criterion to 
determine the delivery model: 
43 
Equation 16, Acceptance Criterion for Sea-to-Sky-Partnerships BC, (Project Report, 
2005): 
Value of Additional 
If NPC of PSC > NPC of S2S + Improvements by PJ = Procure through S2S 
Partner 
If Value of Additional p h h p bl . NPC of PSC < NPC of S2S + Improvements by P3 = rocure t roug u tc 
Provisions 
Partner 
To make the payment streams comparable, Partnerships BC used the public sector 
comparator (PSC) to represent traditional procurement of similar infrastructures through 
a series of DBs over the same 25-year time period. In the following table Partnerships 
BC has presented the payment stream for the P3 partnership assuming full payments and 
the payment stream for traditional procurement without cost for risk events. 
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Table 2, Partial Comparison of Payments under DBFO, (Project Report, 2005): 
Payment Components under DBFO 
($Millions) 
(Assume No Inflation and Provincial 
Base Case Traffic Forecast) 
Year 
MoT& 
Non 
Contract 
Ended 31 
DBFO 
Adjusted 
Year Total 
Month 
Payment 
PSC 
I 2006 63.6 87.7 
2 2007 22.4 24.3 
3 2008 30.1 42.8 
4 2009 42.2 54.1 
5 2010 68 55.2 
6 2011 76.3 53.9 
7 2012 75.8 52.9 
8 2013 75.5 52.1 
9 2014 75 .2 51.4 
10 2015 75 50.6 
11 2016 74.7 49.9 
12 2017 74.3 52.6 
13 2018 74.1 48.6 
14 2019 73.8 52.4 
15 2020 73 .6 52.1 
16 2021 73 .3 51.4 
17 2022 73.1 50.8 
18 2023 72.7 50.2 
19 2024 72.5 49.7 
20 2025 72.3 49.2 
21 2026 72.1 50 
22 2027 71.9 49.6 
23 2028 71.6 49.3 
24 2029 71.4 52.1 
25 2030 102.3 60.6 
Total 1727.8 1293.5 
Partnerships BC does not provide a breakdown of its estimate for the respective yearly 
costs to pursue the PSC except to say that the payments do not include any costs of risk 
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events. Payments to the DBFO include the availability payments, volume usage 
payments, performance incentive payments, end of term payment, and the theoretical cost 
of a MoT DBFO. The DBFO payment is the maximum payment that S2S would receive 
if it met all the obligations and financial incentives ofthe P3 contract. Assuming that the 
calculations of the PSC are comparable to those of an actual future DB contract, the next 
step would be determining a figure of merit. The figure of merit used by partnerships BC 
is presented in Table 3. Both the private partner and Partnerships BC have estimated 
their discount rate at 7.5% (Project Report, 2006). 
Table 3, Comparison ofthe NPC ofthe PSC and the DBFO, (Project Report, 2005): 
Partnerships BC Project Report: Achieving Value for Money, Sea-to-Sky Highway 
Improvement Project 
Comparison of the Net Present Cost of the PSC and DBFO ($Millions) 
Analysis 
Completed December 2005 
Description 
December 2005 
PSC P3 
Payment to S2S 0 578.5 
Capital Costs 516 208.1 
Operations & Maintenance Costs 107.5 3.2 
Rehabilitation Costs 36.3 0 
Risk Adjustment 42.9 0 
Self-Insurance Policy of the Province 37.1 0 
Tax-Exempt Status of Public Sector Corporations 4.2 
Total Cost- Risk Adjusted 744 789.8 
Partnerships BC and MoT chose to use the P3 consortium based not on their acceptance 
criterion, but on additional benefits provided by the P3 proposal. Partnerships BC and 
MoT felt that highway improvements in excess of the baseline improvements required 
46 
were presented in the bid; therefore, the PSC estimate was significant underestimate of 
the cost of the improvements the Ministry will receive through a P3 7. 
V. Evaluation of the Procurement Decision -A Critical Look 
We treat this decision as a traditional project payment and revenue stream. The 
acceptance criterion (discussed earlier in this paper) is as follows : 
Equation 17, Acceptance Criterion for Sea-to-Sky-Paper: 
Net Benefit to Public 
Sector of Foregoing 
S2S 
Net Benefit to Public 
Sector of Foregoing 
S2S 
> 0 = Procure through Public 
Provision 
< 0 Procure through S2S 
Table 4 (Appendix I) illustrates the model presented in Table 1 to make the payment 
streams represent that of a traditional project and to forecast the costs over the time 
horizon provided by Partnerships BC. This model excludes some constants, including 
risks, operational and maintenance costs, and capital outlays. Capital costs exist in both 
options (Project Report, 2005), and certain operational and maintenance costs exist 
outside of this agreement. Here, the net difference of these costs represents what would 
exist in a traditional procurement. Risks associated with the project in the procurement 
decision are also equitable (Equation 4) and have therefore been omitted from the 
7 This represents the difference between the NPC ofthe P3 and the PSC. The sum of the expected user 
benefits from the incremental improvements (above baseline improvements) is estimated to be $131 million 
NPV over the life of the contract by Partnerships BC (Project Report, 2005). 
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equation. To make the payment streams more comparable, an opportunity costs (OC) 
calculation at the bottom of the table yields the benefit to the government of foregoing the 
P3 in terms of payments. This represents the capital cash flows to S2S of investing in the 
Sea-to-Sky project. Table 4 shows that while the capital outlay would still be significant 
at $355.82 million; S2S would receive an additional $35.6 million in payments made over 
the next 25 years. As the cost difference between the traditional procurement and P3 
consortium (assuming the capital costs were also averaged over the life of the project) is 
simply the service payments made to the P3 , we should be able to use S2S ' s IRR of 7.5% 
to value the foregone payments. Given that we have simplified this evaluation, the IRR 
for the project yields 9%. Based on our acceptance criterion, MoT should choose public 
provision for the Sea-to-Sky Highway only if they are able to invest in the given project 
at a larger IRR. However, as we will discuss next, evaluating the Sea-to-Sky 
procurement decision would lead one to believe that a lower IRR for government 
provision was more plausible given the extra scope ofthe work entailed with the project. 
The problem with the application of this simplistic approach to the Sea-to-Sky project is 
that the scope of the project used to develop the PSC was less than the scope of the P3 
project. The costs of the additional improvements from a P3 were not estimated; 
however, the value, as a benefit was. This additional value was placed at $131 million. 
In applying Equation 17, as the deci sion rule, this $131 million value should be taken into 
consideration for this particular project. The above framework does not account for the 
additional perceived benefits of the P3 . These benefits, valued at an NPV to users at 
$131 million, represented an additional consideration. Although it is not the intent of this 
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paper to dispute this claim, it illustrates the importance of considering these types of other 
factors when a non-conventional P3 procurement process is used. 
VI. Limitations of the Assessment for the Sea-to-Sky P3 
There are several limitations of our analysis of the Sea-to-Sky P3 . First, our model is 
based on information provided in the Project Report (2005) prepared by Partnerships BC. 
The accuracy and validity of the assumptions, context, decisions, procurement process, 
and results to date of the Sea-to-Sky project come from a review by the auditor general of 
the Province (Project Report, 2005). Second, the forecasting used in Table 5 assumes a 
straight-line relationship of the costs involved with the project over the life of the 
contract. This makes forecasting more practical and reduces the complexity of the 
analysis. Finally, the information as presented in the Project Report (2005) is slightly 
dated; we assume, however, that it is still accurate and relevant to discussion. 
CHAPTERS 
Conclusion 
This paper has illustrated the importance of distinguishing, modeling, and discounting the 
procurement decision. Much of the current literature focuses on determination of the 
discount rate and whether to invest in public infrastructure. Once the decision to invest 
has been made, both transferable and nontransferable risks need to be considered in 
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valuing the underlying risk to the project. These transferable risks have been presented 
categorically as construction, operational , and financing risks; economic, informational , 
and political risks are nontransferable to the P3 consortium . The financial valuation of 
the procurement decision then follows with a look at the net benefit to the government of 
foregoing the P3 agreement. Net benefits are discounted by the IRR because calculating 
an IRR from a private partner's procurement provides a better estimate of the cost of 
capital than does an observed W ACC or application of the CAPM models to estimate the 
return investors (taxpayers or private) would need to receive the compensate for the 
investment made. As the difference between the procurements decisions is simply the 
payments made to the P3 , the IRR of the P3 consortium can be used to discount the net 
difference of the foregone payments to the P3 to arrive at a net benefit to government of 
procuring public infrastructure through traditional procurement. A positive net benefit 
means public provision is preferred, and the alternative is true if the net benefit is 
negative. 
To validate this methodology, this paper examined the recent Sea-to-Sky P3 project and 
Partnerships BC ' s valuation of the procurement decision. The purpose of this exercise 
was to validate the model and the arguments made within this paper. The model and 
methodology used by this paper were both more valid as well as relevant to the 
procurement decision. The model also better analyzed the risks involved with this project 
and the net benefit of foregoing the P3 investment. The net benefit realized using our 
model would not be calculated for the Sea-to-Sky project, and the decision to deliver 
through public provision or P3 had to be based on other considerations. These 
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considerations were deemed valuable to the assessment and therefore the P3 model was 
chosen. However, the framework used does provide a better analysis for conventional P3 
projects and has application when additional considerations are not present. It can also be 
said, that the above framework can incorporate such benefits if information at the outset 
ofthe project is readily available and such non-conventions are identified. 
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